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Debt-to-GDP measures in major OECD countries are at historical highs 
and a considerable part of sovereign debt needs to be refinanced soon, 
while projections of real GDP growth are fairly weak and uncertain and 
assessed sovereign credit quality has declined. Against this, the OECD 
Committee on Financial Markets discussed proposals for sovereign debt 
managers to consider issuing GDP-linked sovereign bonds. The Committee 
considered proposals timely and the idea conceptually attractive, as 
additional insurance against economic downturns over the medium term 
would be available. It identified however also a number of issues that 
would complicate issuance in practise. Questions arise in particular as 
regards investor demand for such instruments and how an additional 
novelty, liquidity and indexation premium would compare to a potentially 
reduced default premium on more traditional debt. Debt management 
offices confirm and stress such practical difficulties and remain sceptical, 
quoting a lack of sustainable demand for such bonds. As a result, issuance 
of such bonds would be too costly. It is not clear however whether debt 
management offices take into account the full macroeconomic and financial 
stability risk-return trade-off that a broader perspective would take into 
account. Proposals for issuance of sovereign GDP-linked bonds among 
advanced economies, which had received increased attention after the 
German G20-presidency included the topic in the G20 finance track, may 
have lost some momentum, but there continues to be considerable support 
from both academics and some practitioners.
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1. Introduction
OECD sovereign debt has attained a historically high level in relation to GDP. Moreover, aggregate marketable debt is projected to increase, while 
the outlook for real activity is neither strong nor certain. 
Recent upwards revision notwithstanding, the investment 
and productivity outlook are preoccupying. Against this 
background, the OECD Committee on Financial Markets 
(CMF) decided to focus its attention to the structure of 
sovereign debt in terms of instruments used, including in 
particular on proposals for OECD sovereign to issue GDP-
linked bonds. Such instruments, in principle, afford sovereigns 
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with additional fiscal space should the real activity outlook 
weaken noticeably.
In a world of Ricardian equivalence, with lump-sum taxes, 
infinite horizons and perfect capital markets, the composition 
of government debt does not matter (Barro, 1995) [1]. Even 
recognising that real-world taxes are distortionary, the form 
of debt instrument does not matter, and the government 
would use debt management only with the aim of smoothing 
over time the collection of required taxes. Once however the 
extreme assumption of certainty about interest rates, price 
levels, etc. is dropped, and uncertainty about these variables 
acknowledged, the composition of government debt and what 
types of instruments are issued matter. For example, in the 
presence of positive transaction costs associated with debt 
renegotiations, introducing additional flexibility by making 
debt instruments explicitly state-contingent can avoid such 
costs and enable different nominal debt trajectories. This 
situation can be preferable to one where debt payments are 
implicitly state-contingent, which effectively describes any 
nominal debt.
The composition of sovereign debt, that is, in terms of 
short-term versus long-term, fixed-rate nominal versus index-
linked debt instruments, etc. has thus gained heightened 
attention among policy makers, academics and public debt 
managers in OECD countries. For example, calls for debt-
financed public investment to boost potential output growth 
were made, on the basis that low interest rates allow sovereign 
debtors to restructure the term of outstanding debt and to 
“lock-in” low refunding costs for the long-term. Also, against 
the backdrop of historically high sovereign debt levels and an 
uncertain real activity growth outlook, the idea of governments 
issuing financial instruments whose repayments are indexed 
to domestic GDP has received renewed attention. Making part 
of sovereign debt explicitly state-contingent could enhance 
sovereign debt sustainability and provide additional fiscal 
flexibility, provide investors with greater diversification 
opportunities, as well as foster financial market resilience by 
facilitating transfer of specific types of macroeconomic risks to 
private investors who are willing to share in those risks against 
a premium payment.
The present article draws heavily on work prepared 
pursuant to the suggestions made by the OECD Committee on 
Financial Markets (CMF) when discussing selected sovereign 
debt issues in 2017. At that meeting, the Committee focused 
specific attention to proposals for OECD sovereigns to issue 
GDP-linked debt instruments. The Committee considered the 
idea conceptually attractive, but also identified a number of 
issues that would complicate issuance in practise. Questions 
arise in particular as regards investor demand for such 
instruments, and how an additional novelty, liquidity and GDP-
indexation premium would compare to potentially reduced 
default premium on more traditional debt. 
To provide some background for the issue of GDP-linked 
sovereign debt instruments, the second section discusses 
selected recent developments regarding sovereign borrowing 
in the OECD. The third section discusses the rationale for 
recent proposals to consider issuance of debt instruments 
whose payments are linked to economic variables such as 
GDP, and draws some lessons from experiences with inflation-
index-linked sovereign bonds. The fourth section reports 
various policy maker discussions and places a sharp focus 
on the challenges that were identified regarding issuance in 
practise. Section V concludes.
2. Background: Selected Developments 
Regarding OECD Government Borrowing
2.1 Continued Net Borrowing in an Environment of 
Low and Even Negative Interest Rates
The borrowing outlook in OECD countries has somewhat 
stabilised, with both gross and net borrowing needs of OECD 
governments flattening during recent years (Figure 1). 
That said, still positive net borrowing requirements imply a 
continued increase in central government marketable debt, 
even if that growth is at more moderate rates than previously. 
Nominal central government debt stands at around USD 45.0 
trillion in 2018.
Interest rates continue to be low by historical standards in 
OECD countries. Interest rates have declined by more than 
GDP growth and the decline in interest rates more than offsets 
the increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio. As a result, even though 
debt-to-GDP levels are still at historically high levels, debt-
servicing is facilitated and relatively larger burdens of debt can 
be sustained at current levels of interest rates, a situation that 
has also lead to calls to boost potential output growth by debt-
financed additional public investment (Box 1).
Figure 1. Sovereign borrowing has somewhat stabilised 
in OECD countries
Notes: GBR = gross borrowing requirement, NBR = net borrowing 
requirement. General government deficit is derived from the general 
government net lending as published in the OECD Economic Outlook 
No. 102 for all OECD countries except for Chile, Mexico and Turkey 
for which the source is the IMF World Economic Outlook (October 
2017). Figures are calculated based on data in national currencies using 
exchange rates as of 1 December 2009.
Source: OECD Sovereign Borrowing Outlook 2018 [2].
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Box 1: Calls for Debt-financed Public Investment 
to Boost Potential Output Growth
The observation that interest rates have declined 
by more than GDP growth has motivated calls to 
exploit the interest rate-growth differential, so as to 
escape what appears to be a low-growth trap of weak 
investment and productivity, reflected in low potential 
per capita output growth. As the role of monetary policy 
to address these issues is limited and monetary policy 
support for real activity growth is already exceptionally 
strong, policy advice has been reassessing the role of 
fiscal policies. In particular, in addition to structural 
reforms, a need to reassess fiscal policies has been 
diagnosed, with the suggested focus of such policies to 
be placed more sharply on the consequences for growth 
as opposed to budget balances and debt reduction. For 
example, according to the OECD Economic Outlook, 
fiscal space (broadly defined as additional room 
available for sovereign debt levels to grow before 
access to new borrowing would be compromised) 
has increased in many advanced economies, mainly 
a s  a  r e su l t  o f  dec l in ing  in te res t  r a t e s .  OECD 
governments could finance a 0.5 percentage point of 
GDP productivity-enhancing fiscal initiative in OECD 
countries for three to four years on average, without 
raising the debt-to-GDP ratio in the medium term, 
provided the selected activities and projects are sound. 
An easing of the fiscal stance through well-targeted 
growth-friendly measures is not expected to aggravate 
the debt-to-GDP ratio in the short term, whilst well-
targeted fiscal measures are expected to raise potential 
output (not only raising soft and hard infrastructure 
or education spending, but also cutting harmful taxes) 
so that a temporary debt-financed fiscal expansion 
need not increase debt ratios in the longer term. In 
this context, a communication from the European 
Commission on fiscal policy in the euro area calls for 
a “positive fiscal stance”, defined as both expansionary 
and of high-quality composition (including with regard 
to the expenditure mix), although it recognises that 
countries which have not reached their medium-term 
objective or are under an excessive deficit procedure 
would find it difficult to achieve the suggested fiscal 
expansion.
Monetary  pol icy  measures  such as  lower ing 
policy rates towards and below zero and purchasing 
government bonds have contributed to unusually 
low interest rates in financial markets. The current 
situation results however from a continuation of a 
trend that stretches over several decades, and it reflects 
reduced inflation expectations, compressed risk and 
term premia and a decline in (inflation-adjusted) real 
interest rates. Already low, sovereign bond yields have 
turned negative in some countries. As a result, instead 
of paying interest, a number of OECD governments 
are now being paid by investors for the “privilege” to 
hold their bonds. This assessment describes a situation 
in which, for example, fixed-rate zero-coupon nominal 
bond that promises a payment of 100 is issued as a 
price exceeding 100; clarifications have been made 
to rule out the possibility of investors being charged 
negative coupons (Box 2). In any case, the widespread 
incidence of this phenomenon is unprecedented in 
financial market history.
Box 2: Ruling out negative coupon payments 
In the case of some other securities, clarifications 
have been made to rule out the possibility of investors 
being charged negative coupons. Such a situation 
could arise in the case of variable-coupon government 
bond where the coupon is set by adding a spread to 
a reference interest rate that however might become 
sufficiently negative to erode this spread. 
For example, Italian Treasury Credit Certificates 
(CCTs) pay semi-annual coupons that are calculated 
with reference to the 6-month Treasury Bills (BOTs) 
yield at issuance augmented by a spread of 0.30% on an 
annual basis. Similarly, the Ministry of Economy and 
Finance issues European Treasury Credit Certificates 
(CCTeu), which are securities whose semi-annual 
coupons are indexed to 6-month EURIBOR, augmented 
by a spread that varies from issue to issue. The 
considerations regarding the level of coupons in the 
event of negative interest rates discussed below apply 
to both CCTs and CCTeu. 
As market interest rates declined below zero, a 
situation whereby the spread would be fully eroded 
became more likely, and authorities in Italy recognised 
that existing decrees did not rule out explicitly the 
possibility of negative interest rates. The question 
arose whether and how would the Treasury collect 
the related value from each individual investor and/or 
whether it should be understood that the lowest limit 
on the coupon is equal to zero. The Attorney General’s 
Office addressed the question in an opinion published 
on 3 December 2015 as follows: “The relationship that 
is established with subscription of redeemable public-
debt securities, in which the nominal amount is equal 
to the sum to be repaid at maturity, is referable to a 
type of long-term loan contract. The CCT and CCTeu 
are instruments incorporating uncertainty due to the 
variability of the interest rate, but the borrower’s 
obligation to repay the principal is not uncertain. The 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.30564/jesr.v2i2.474
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provisions of the Italian Civil Code with respect to 
a long-term loan contract provide that such contract 
naturally has a cost for the borrower only, and not 
for the lender, who is not required to sustain the risk 
of a negative interest rate such as to also affect the 
lender’s capital (Article 1813 of the Italian Civil Code, 
in relation to the obligation to pay back the same 
amount of money). In essence, the maximum risk for 
the lender is that of the gratuitousness of the contract. 
In addition, the Italian Civil Code also provides that 
services qualified as interest must be for the account of 
the borrower, and this prevents one from considering, 
albeit implicitly, that, as such, the services are to be for 
the account of the lender. … The Attorney General’s 
Office concludes that the necessary solution is that 
"the regulation of the relationship includes an implicit 
provision, whereby, in the event of negative interest 
rates, the minimum coupon is equal to zero.”
2.2 Using Low Interest Rates to Buy Insurance 
Against Sovereign Debt Roll-over Risk
An environment in which long-term rates are very low 
also makes it cheaper for sovereign debt managers to 
insure against rollover risk. Reflecting a response to a 
changed trade-off between the costs of such insurance 
and the refinancing risks with no insurance, sovereign 
debt management offices have tended to buy additional 
insurance. This situation is reflected in weighted 
average term-to-maturity (ATM) numbers that have 
increased, thus implying a slower pass-through effect of 
potential interest rate increases to government's interest 
payments in the future. By itself, this observation 
is reassuring, given the need to roll-over substantial 
amounts of debt coming due over the next few years. 
That said, buying this type of assurance is not costless; 
in fact, it has limited the extent to which the decline 
in interest rates has fed through to actual government 
interest rate expenses. In fact, Figure 2 illustrates that 
the interest rate decline is not matched one-by-one by 
a decline in net interest payments on government debt. 
In addition to the observation that not all debt is rolled 
over instantly, this observation reflects that OECD 
sovereign borrowing offices have taken advantage of 
declining and historically low interest rates to extend 
average terms of maturity of outstanding sovereign 
debt.
Figure 2. Central government marketable gross 
borrowing, interest payments and long-term interest rates
Notes: OECD area estimates. Net interest payments from the Economic 
Outlook database and refers to a wider concept of government 
liabilities than central government marketable debt. Long-term interest 
rates derived from long-term interest rate on government bonds 
calculated as a GDP weighted average.
Source: OECD Sovereign Borrowing Outlook 2018 [2].
Government debt managers routinely measure and 
monitor refinancing risk exposure of the government 
debt portfolio. In particular, they use various metrics 
that measure rollover risk so as to allow them to identify 
vulnerabilities in the government debt structure and to 
reduce portfolio risk in relation to a given benchmark. 
Widely used indicators include the ratio of debt maturing 
in a specific period expressed as a share of the total debt 
portfolio the average term to maturity (ATM). Figure 3 
presents the debt service of outstanding medium- and 
long-term central government marketable debt for the 
next 12, 24 and 36 months. Total debt service of OECD 
governments for the following 3 years is around 40% 
of the outstanding marketable debt, one fifth of which 
is due in the next 12 months. This number is somewhat 
more favourable in risk terms than it was in previous 
years in the sense that the amount of debt coming due 
over the immediate future has declined. The flipside 
of this evolution is that it reduces to some extent the 
capacity to refinance maturing debt at what might be 
considered advantageously low interest rates. Figure 4 
shows that the weighted ATM of outstanding marketable 
debt in the OECD area has increased by about 2 years 
compared to the pre-crisis period, from about 6 to about 
8 years as of end-2017, compared to 10 years before. In 
several countries including Denmark, Ireland, Mexico, 
Switzerland and the United Kingdom), the average term-
to-maturity of sovereign outstanding marketable debt 
rose by more years between 2007 and 2017. By contrast, 
some sovereigns, including the United States and 
Germany have stabilised average maturities at specific 
levels and taken advantage of very low short-term 
interest rates rather than extending the duration of their 
outstanding debt. Reflecting this strategy as well as the 
observation that the outstanding stock of debt as of GDP 
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is more limited than in other G7 countries, gross interest 
rate payments as of GDP are relatively low in Germany. 
Looking ahead, Maravalle and Rawdanowicz (2018) 
[3] suggest an additional substantial lengthening of the 
average sovereign debt maturity in G7 countries would 
in several cases imply substantial additional cumulative 
fiscal costs over the next decades.
Figure 3. Cumulative percentage of debt maturing in 
the next 12, 24 and 36 months (As a percentage of total 
marketable debt as of 2017)
Notes: Cumulative percentage of debt maturing in the next 12, 24 and 
36 months (i.e. in 2018, 2019 and 2020) as a percentage of total 
marketable debt stock (without cash) in 2016. Values of principal 
payments and marketable debt have been aggregated into a single 
currency by using fixed exchange rates, as of 1st December 2009, for 
all years. “Euro area - 16 members” includes the following OECD 
countries: Austria, Belgium, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovak 
Republic, Slovenia and Spain. "Emerging OECD" include Chile, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Mexico, Poland, Slovak Republic, 
Slovenia and Turkey. “Other OECD” includes Australia, Denmark, 
Iceland, Israel, Korea, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland.
Source: OECD Sovereign Borrowing Outlook 2018 [2].
Figure 4. Average term-to-maturity of outstanding 
marketable debt in selected OECD countries
Notes: Average term-to-maturity in years (e.g. 0.5 years correspond to 
6 months) of outstanding marketable debt. Data are not strictly 
comparable across countries. The weighted average was calculated based 
on the data of all countries for which the average term to maturity was 
available for 2007, 2013, and 2017. The values of central government 
marketable debt (without cash) in 2007, 2013, and 2017, expressed in 
USD values using the December 2009 exchange rates, were used as 
weights in constructing the average.
Source: OECD Sovereign Borrowing Outlook 2018 [2].
The lengthening of average duration of outstanding 
government debt instruments in many OECD countries 
reflects the growing issuance of ultra-long bonds. The 
history of such bonds goes back at least to the 18th 
Century, when the United Kingdom borrowed through 
issuance of “undated” gilts (consols). More than two 
centuries later, the UK government redeemed its last 
outstanding consols in 2015. Issuance of ultra-long-
term sovereign bonds, defined here as bonds with a 
maturity at issue equal to or exceeding 30 years, have 
been nonetheless a fairly rare phenomenon, until recently. 
For example, the economist Barro (1995) [1], in a widely 
quoted NBER working paper on debt management, 
implied his astonishment about the issuance of some ultra-
long term bonds in the United Kingdom by noting: “More 
recently, the UK government has issued indexed coupon 
bonds with maturities as long as 38 years, which is nearly 
infinity.” Incidentally, before a shortened version of that 
article was published in 1999 in a journal (excluding that 
statement however), China and the Philippines had issued 
a 100-year bond in 1996 and 1997, respectively. Even if 
the actual amount of ultra-long-term bond issues is not 
very significant, with issues typically being not very large 
in size, these types of instruments might have become to 
be considered “conventional” (Box 3).
There are however also potential risks related to efforts 
to fix the rate of interest payable on debt over long periods 
for the issuer of such debt. When discussing the issue at the 
meeting of the OECD Working Party on Debt Management, 
several debt managers highlighted the relevance of “regret 
risk”. This risk is meant to describe a situation where the 
issuer believes that rates have reached historical minimum 
levels, and based on this assessment issues significant 
amount of debt, only to find out that rates subsequently 
fell further. High volumes of ultra-long-term debt might 
also turn out to be unnecessary, as borrowing needs might 
decline. Issuing ultra-long-term debt “opportunistically” 
might also conflict with the idea of regular and predictable 
sovereign debt issuance policies, and it could also adversely 
affect liquidity in other segments of the yield curve. Debt 
managers agreed that careful consideration needs to be 
given to the depth and sustainability of investor demand for 
such instruments. It appears that the main buyers of these 
securities are insurance companies and pension funds that 
are characterised by long durations on their liability side, 
although a considerable amount of demand also reflects a 
search for positive nominal yields by other investors in an 
environment where sovereign bonds pay negative rates in 
some cases up to ten years of maturity.
In any case, taking a macro-perspective that goes beyond 
the analysis of the costs and benefits for the issuer of debt, 
the flip-side of (successful) efforts to limit sovereign debt 
portfolio refinancing risk exposures is an increase in the 
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interest rate risk faced by the investors in sovereign bonds. 
Admittedly, while the primary risk confronting many retail 
and institutional investors is a continuation of the very-
low-rate environment which adversely affects, for example, 
defined benefit pension funds and life insurance companies 
with guaranteed products as well as investors attempting to 
secure a specific minimum retirement income from capital 
market investments, another risk is that of a rapid and 
unexpected increase in interest rates. To illustrate that point, 
Figure 5 shows a measure of duration risk and provides a 
simple numerical illustration of the magnitude of potential 
losses of G7 sovereign debt holders in the case of a 
100 basis points interest rate increase. It contains a snapshot 
of such risks for March 2017, with estimates being prepared 
for a presentation given at a subsequent meeting of the FSB 
Analytical Group on Vulnerabilities. It uses the example 
of the outstanding debt of G7 sovereign borrowers, which 
incidentally account for more than 85% of total annual 
OECD central government borrowing. The circles indicate 
estimated mark-to-market losses on individual bonds 
assuming a 1% upward shift in the yield curve. Aggregating 
those losses, one obtains a total loss of about 1.6 trillion 
USD, which corresponds to a percentage loss of 6.5% 
on the outstanding stock of about 25 trillion USD of G7 
sovereign debt at March 2017 (Table 1). It highlights that 
modified duration of the OECD sovereign bond universe 
and potential losses for bondholders from an interest rate 
increase have substantially risen during the observation 
period, as highlighted by the dots identifying individual 
bonds shifting towards the south-east of the chart. 
Even though interest rates are generally projected to 
increase over the next few years in the major regions, 
although to different extents, the longer the situation of 
historically low rates lasts, the more observers come to 
believe that this situation might be the “new normal”. 
Exceptional as the current episode of low interest rates 
appears by historical standards, predictions of a reversal to 
the “normal” have so far repeatedly been proved wrong. As 
a result, investors might have been led to believe that the 
risk of a sudden snap-back of rates is limited.
Box 3: Debt Manager Considerations Regarding 
Ultra-long-term Bonds: From Opportunistic Issuance to 
Standard Practice?
The OECD Working Party on Public Debt Management 
(WPDM), a working party of the OECD CMF, at its 
meeting in November 2016, acknowledged the potential 
benefits and challenges associated with issuance of such 
ultra-long bonds. Such issuance limits refinancing risk, 
provides predictability of redemptions over decades in 
advance, and diversifies a government's debt portfolio. 
Reflecting these considerations, in the case of several 
large issuers including the United States, the United 
Kingdom, Japan and Italy, 30-year bonds have been part 
of their regular borrowing programs for some time now, 
and issuance has met with strong and sustained investor 
demand. Many debt management officers noted that bonds 
with maturities exceeding 30 years allow the issuer to “lock 
in” historically low interest rates and reduce refinancing 
risk. In terms of issuance techniques, in countries where 
30-year bonds are already part of financing programs, 
auctions are the most widely used method of bond sale. 
Bonds are often regularly issued and re-opened after the 
initial issuance, so that outstanding volumes and trade levels 
in the market are such that an efficient price formation of 
new issues through auctions is considered feasible. By 
contrast, in the case of a debt issue of an ultra-long-term 
bond, several debt management offices prefer syndications 
and a few small issuers use private placements. 
As part of the discussions by the OECD Committee on 
Financial Markets in April 2017 of selected sovereign debt 
issues, one delegate noted that the Committee had discussed 
the issuance of long-term bonds and concluded that there 
would be considerable demand for long-duration bonds. 
Such demand would stem in particular from institutional 
investors that in turn have long-duration liabilities, 
exceeding several decades. This observation is consistent 
with earlier suggestions by the Committee. For example, 
in October 2006, the CMF concluded that the potential 
demand for long-term high-credit-quality sovereign bonds 
could, in principle, be very substantial, sufficient in fact to 
result in a scarcity of such bonds in circulation (Ervin and 
Schich, 2007) [4]. Back then, while many debt managers 
had already taken advantage of favourable bond market 
conditions and issued more long-term debt, the Committee 
concluded that the question whether they should follow a 
strategy of maturity-lengthening with the express aim to 
facilitate the task for pension fund managers is however a 
different matter. In fact, the Committee concluded “most 
policy makers would not recommend that governments 
undertake to issue long-term debt with the express intent 
of meeting this demand, not least because they expect the 
price mechanism to clear apparent imbalances in asset 
markets.” 
Looking back, the financing of the immediate policy 
response to the global financial crisis involved some 
shortening of the maturity structure of new borrowing and 
debt outstanding, although already shortly afterwards a 
trend increase in the issuance of ultra-long-term bonds could 
be observed. This trend increase consisted in a gradually 
increasing number of sovereigns having issued at least one 
ultra-long-term bond. In 2006, no OECD government had 
issued any such bond. During the subsequent years, more 
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and more sovereigns issued such bonds, some of them even 
repeatedly. Notable exceptions include Germany and the 
United States. For example, in the United States, the longest 
Treasury bond maturity is currently 30 years (although 
issuance was discontinued between 2001 and 2006) 
and the United States Treasury Department is currently 
considering the idea of issuing longer-term bonds. As part 
of its Quarterly Refunding, the Treasury held discussions 
with the private sector members of the Treasury Borrowing 
Advisory Committee (TBAC), among other things, on 
the possible issuance of bonds with maturities of 40 or 
50 years or longer. The feedback received will be combined 
with the results of research of an internal working group 
to study ultra-long bonds. The committee said it does not 
see evidence of “notably strong or sustainable demand” for 
ultra-long bonds, adding however that issuing more longer-
term debt could make sense if Treasury wanted to raise 
its borrowing capacity. Such discussions are motivated by 
attempts to facilitate the financing of significant amounts of 
public infrastructure investments. Such an approach is not 
without precedence; for example, in 1911, the United States 
government issued bonds with 50 years of maturity-at-issue 
to fund the construction of the Panama Canal.
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Figure 5. Duration risk of the portfolio of outstanding G7 
government debt is high (Mark-to-market losses for a 1% 
yield-curve upward shift)
Notes: Approximate losses on government bonds issued by G7 
governments in G7 markets for an assumed market interest rate increase 
by 1% (vertical axis, in USD billion), based on bond-specific estimates 
of modified duration (horizontal axis, in years) multiplied by the market 
value of the amount of bond outstanding. As of end-March 2017 and end-
December 2011. Not considering exchange rate changes. Excludes short-
term securities.
Source: Thomson Reuters; OECD Secretariat calculations.
Table 1. Aggregate mark-to-market losses on G7 sovereign 
bonds for 1% market rate increase
2011 2017
Outstanding amounts (USD trillion) 20 25
Potential losses (USD trillion) -1.2 -1.6
Memo: Losses in per cent of outstanding -5.8 -6.5
Notes: Figure shows approximate losses on investments in government 
bonds issued by G7 governments in G7 markets and outstanding at the 
end of 2011 and end-March 2017 (each circle representing one bond), 
assuming a market interest rate increase by 1% (vertical axis, in USD 
billion), based on bond-specific estimates of modified duration (horizontal 
axis, in years) multiplied by the amount issued of this specific bond. Table 
shows aggregate for all bonds at each date. 
Source: Thomson Reuters, and author calculations.
2.3 Developments in the assessed credit quality of 
(conventional) OECD sovereign bond issues
Most public debt managers have used the opportunity of 
the low-interest-rate environment to buy some insurance 
against roll-over risk by increasing the average remaining 
maturity of the stock of outstanding debt. Such measures 
are however not free of costs as long as the yield curve 
is upward sloping, which is currently the case in OECD 
countries. A notable exemption from the general trend 
towards yield average-maturity lengthening is Germany, 
where the average term-to-maturity has stabilised during 
the past five years. As a result, gross interest payments as 
of GDP are very low compared to other G7 countries (see 
e.g. Figure 1, panel B of Maravalle and Rawdanowicz, 
2018 [3]). The amount of sovereign debt coming due over 
the short term differs considerably from one OECD country 
to another and is considerable for the group as a whole, 
with an estimated cumulative amount of 40% of total 
marketable coming due until the end of 2020 (Figure 3). 
That amount is equivalent to more than half of the total 
marketable debt stock in OECD countries a decade before, 
if expressed in 2009 US dollars (Figure 1). Given such 
considerable need to finance debt redemptions (and budget 
deficits), the assessed credit quality of OECD sovereign 
debt issues deserves some attention.  
Measures of the assessed credit quality of OECD 
sovereign debt suggest that the latter has declined over the 
last decade. For example, a measure derived from credit 
rating agency assessments illustrates that more than 18 000 
bonds debt instruments issued during the last decade of 
sovereigns from the OECD are characterised by a trend 
decline in their credit rating (Figure 6). The average 
credit rating of OECD sovereign debt issues was around 
17 notches (on a scale up to 19) at the beginning of the 
sample, which is equivalent to high-grade. It has declined 
to around 15 more recently, which is upper medium grade. 
Much of the dynamics reflect the downgrade in May 2012 
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of Japan by Fitch. Incidentally, S&P downgraded Japan 
already more than a year earlier, in January 2011. Going 
further back, Japan lost its last prime rating from Moody’s 
in May 2009 (at a point where S&P and Fitch had already 
considered Japan only as high grade). 
Combining the data from all three credit rating agencies 
and considering the maximum of all three confirms the 
assessment that the universe of OECD sovereign debt 
issuance has evolved considerably. Figure 6 identifies 
through the two light-shaded areas the volume-weighted 
issuance of prime and high grade sovereign debt, 
respectively, from OECD countries. The area shrinks over 
time. Incidentally, that observation is also interesting as it 
qualifies to some extent the observation that an observed 
decrease in the ratings and in particular in the share of 
triple-A investments of institutional investors’ fixed income 
portfolios can be interpreted as a sign for “search-for-yield”. 
In fact, the chart shows that the supply of such debt is 
declining and that simply buying the same mix of sovereign 
debt issues from OECD countries every year implies 
already a trend decline in higher-rated investments. In 
any case, there is a risk that a deteriorating assessed credit 
quality will affect investor demand at one point.
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Figure 6. Prime and high-grade OECD sovereign debt 
issuance is declining
Note: Breakdown of quarterly issuance of long-term (ten years or more) 
sovereign debt issues from OECD countries into credit rating categories 
(i.e. maximum assigned by either Fitch, Moody’s or S&P) from January 
2008 to December 2017.  Weighted by volume.
Source: OECD Secretariat estimates based on Thomson Reuters 
Datastream.
3. Rationale for Issuing Sovereign Bonds with 
Payments Linked to GDP
3.1 Proposals for Considering Issuance of 
Sovereign GDP-linked Bonds in OECD Countries
Given the current historically high sovereign debt levels 
(Figure 7), and the weak and uncertain real activity 
growth outlook, the idea of governments issuing financial 
instruments whose repayments are indexed to domestic 
GDP has received renewed attention. While many OECD 
sovereigns have purchased some insurance against roll-
over-risk by extending the average maturity of their 
outstanding debt, the assessed credit quality of conventional 
sovereign debt instruments in the OECD has declined over 
the past decade and it is hard to predict whether investor 
demand will remain strong if and when interest rate return 
to historical norms. 
Fuelling that debate, a report developed by several 
central banks for the G20 argues that, in theory, the case 
for issuing such forms of state-contingent debt might 
be particularly strong now. The report argues that GDP-
linked bonds offer additional fiscal space in downturns 
and an alternative way of reducing leverage from high 
debt levels, which implies that the benefits from issuing 
such instruments are likely to be largest when debt levels 
are already high relative to GDP and there is an attempt to 
minimize the probability of debt reaching an unsustainable 
trajectory. 
Related work prepared for the G20, which included the 
topic of state-contingent bonds as one of its priorities of 
the finance track under the German presidency in 2016, 
encourages policy makers and debt management offices to 
consider proposals for issuing new types of index-linked 
bonds, in particular, debt instruments whose repayments 
are linked to domestic GDP developments. Such proposals 
to issue debt the servicing of which is linked to GDP 
shocks is considered attractive according to its proponents, 
especially given currently high sovereign debt levels. The 
Communiqué of the meeting of G20 Finance Ministers 
and Central Bank Governors March 18, 2017, in Baden 
Baden referenced related follow-up work as follows: 
“With a view to ensuring debt sustainability, we welcome 
Operational Guidelines for Sustainable Financing reflecting 
responsibilities of borrowers and lenders. The Compass 
for GDP-linked Bonds provides an overview of important 
aspects of this instrument.”
Many academic proposals were made for debt 
instruments with payments indexed to economic variables 
although the role of moral hazard on the part of the debtor 
was recognised as a potential major impediment. Against 
this background, indices were thought preferable to the 
extent that they were less directly influenced by debtors’ 
actions. Historical examples have been mostly confined 
to inflation. A widely quoted early example of a type of 
inflation-indexed bond is a “depreciation note”, indexed to 
a basket of goods including corn, beef, wool and leather, by 
the State of Massachusetts in 1780. In more recent history, 
Israel paved the way with inflation-linked bonds issued 
in 1955. The United Kingdom has been issuing inflation-
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linked bonds in 1981, Australia since 1985, Canada since 
1991, Sweden since 1994, the United States since 1997 
(Treasury inflation protected securities, TIPS), France 
since 1998, Italy since 2003, Japan since 2004 (in this case 
deflation-linked bonds) and Germany since 2006.
Following the 1980s debt crises, there was growing 
interest in the idea of sovereigns issuing bonds whose 
service or repayments would be linked to measures of the 
debtors’ payment capacity, exports or commodity prices. 
Mexico has issued bonds indexed to oil prices. Brady bonds 
by Mexico, Venezuela, Nigeria and Uruguay were issued 
to commercial banks foresaw additional payments as a 
function of commodity price developments (Borensztein 
and Mauro, 2004) [5]. Also as part of restructuring 
agreements in the 1980s and 1990s, Costa Rica, Bulgaria, 
and Bosnia and Herzegovina  -- and later Argentina 
(Benford et al., 2016, Box 3) [6], Greece and Ukraine -- 
have issued bonds containing an element of indexation to 
domestic GDP (IMF, 2017, Table 3). In particular, these 
bonds include clauses or warrants that increase the payoff 
to bondholders if the absolute level of GDP or GDP per 
capita of the debtor country rise above a specific threshold 
value.
As regards debt instruments whose repayments are 
linked to domestic GDP developments, it is useful to 
distinguish between potential issuance in sovereign debt 
restructurings, on the one hand, and during "normal 
times", on the other (Benford et al., 2016) [6]. In debt 
restructurings, GDP-linked bonds can help by back-loading 
debt repayments to when recovery is fully underway. 
These bonds thus allow governments to insure themselves 
against subsequent negative growth shocks and having 
to restructure again. Traditionally, the relevance of this 
advantage was discussed in relation to emerging countries’ 
external financial obligations during the 1980s and 1990s, 
although a more recent restructurings involves OECD 
member country Greece. In normal times, that is, outside 
of debt restructurings, GDP-linked bonds offer additional 
fiscal space in downturns, another way of deleveraging 
from high debt levels and a way of preventing solvency 
crises. These benefits are likely to be largest when debt 
levels are already high relative to GDP and there is a 
non-trivial probability of debt reaching an unsustainable 
trajectory.
In fact, the argument for considering the issuance of 
debt whose payments are indexed to GDP by sovereigns 
in mature economies might currently be stronger than it 
was over the past few decades. Public debt levels in several 
major OECD economies are at post-World War II highs, as 
illustrated in Figure 8. Moreover, real economic activity - 
that would allow a country to grow out of relatively high 
debt levels - is currently weak and its prospects uncertain. 
One main advantage of this proposed new kind of debt 
would be to limit the variation of the debt-to-GDP ratio, 
and thus limit the risk of a debt crisis. In a recession, 
when tax revenues are relatively low, GDP-indexed bonds 
would only pay a low interest rate. Such an advantage is 
particularly attractive to an issuer when the real activity 
growth outlook is fairly weak and uncertain, as it is now.
It should be noted, however, that the argument in favour 
of issuing such debt appeared also to be particularly strong 
in the case of emerging market sovereigns during and after 
the 1980s, when the latter experienced costly crises that 
involved default on countries’ external debt obligations. 
Even under those circumstances, such debt did not become 
an established form of sovereign issuance outside of 
debt restructurings. The state-contingent bonds issued by 
emerging markets have formed only a small part of the debt 
stock, complementing a much larger stock of conventional 
debt, and have often been discontinued after a small number 
of issues (IMF, 2017) [7]. So what are the pros and cons of 
issuing and buying sovereign debt using GDP-linked bonds 
in the case of advanced economies?
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Figure 7. Gross general government financial liabilities of 
selected OECD countries (percentage of GDP)
Notes: The chart shows the evolution of several metrics (minimum, 
maximum, median, mean and GDP-weighted average) of general 
government gross financial liabilities expressed as a percentage of 
GDP for a selection of 9 OECD countries (Australia, Canada, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United 
States). The grey area shows the range of minimum and maximum 
values all countries included. Recent data from OECD Economic 
Outlook No 98 and earlier data estimated by extrapolating the recent 
data applying the dynamics observed in the gross general government 
debts as reported in the IMF Historical Public Debt Database. The value 
for Germany for the year 1925 was dropped as its low value generated 
an unusual volatility of debt given the pattern for Germany around that 
period. The remaining gaps in the time series were imputed by fitting 
piecewise cubic splines. Individual countries' time series may include 
methodological breaks. GDP-weights from 1954 to 2017 from IMF 
International Financial Statistics and for earlier period assumed identical 
to values in 1954.
Source: OECD Secretariat estimate. Update from Sovereign Borrowing 
Outlook 2016 (Figure 1.6) [8].
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3.2 Issuer Perspective
From the issuer perspective, the need for additional 
fiscal consolidation would be lessened in cases where 
real activity growth performance turned out to be 
disappointing, provided a substantial part of the debt 
outstanding is in form of GDP-linked bonds. In such 
situations, the adverse feedback effects potentially 
associated with fiscal retrenchment could be avoided and 
the automatic stabilisers be allowed to function as desired. 
Additional room would become available for sovereign 
debt levels to grow before access to new borrowing 
would be compromised, as – effectively -- the sovereign’s 
maximum sustainable debt threshold would rise. When 
and whether such additional space should be used is 
however another question.
GDP-linked bonds lower the probability of contractual 
default on outstanding sovereign debt, relative to 
conventional debt instruments, which turn could in 
principle also lower the default risk premium on the 
sovereigns’ outstanding conventional debt. Such 
advantages tend to be largest where debt levels are already 
high relative to GDP, especially if that situation is reflected 
in low sovereign credit rating assessments. For example, 
Hilscher and Nosbusch (2010) [9] find that the default 
risk premium typically accounts for a larger share of the 
overall borrowing costs for lower-rated emerging market 
sovereign debtors. Credit ratings of OECD sovereign 
borrowers tend to be much stronger, although the assessed 
credit rating quality of bond issues from OECD countries 
has somewhat declined over the past decade, as shown in 
Figures 6 and 7.
Not just debt-to-GDP levels but also their volatility 
matter for borrowing costs. Considering the basic logic of 
option-pricing theory that follows the intuition of Merton 
(1977) [10], the volatility of the debt-to-GDP matters for 
the pricing of sovereign debt: Assuming all else equal, a 
sovereign with more volatile debt-to-GDP developments 
is more likely to experience a severe worsening of such 
ratio, making it more likely that the sovereign is faced 
with a situation where it needs to undertake costly fiscal 
adjustments to avoid contractual default or decide to 
default. There is some empirical evidence that is consistent 
with such an interpretation. For example, Schich (1997) [11] 
finds that the trade financing of emerging markets with 
volatile external financial positions is saddled with higher 
costs than that of countries with more stable positions and 
Hilscher and Nosbusch (2010) [9] identify a similar link 
between emerging market sovereigns borrowing spreads 
and the volatility of their terms of trade. Thus, issuing 
GDP-linked bonds would be expected to bring benefits 
that are greatest to sovereigns of countries that face more 
volatile fundamentals. 
Admittedly, the underlying economic fundamentals tend 
to be more stable in advanced economies than in emerging 
economies. That said, the benefits in terms of volatility-
limiting effects from GDP-linked bonds to sovereigns 
from advanced economies can also be substantial. For 
example, GDP-linked bonds could generate substantial 
stabilising effects on debt-to-GDP developments even 
for G-7 countries where GDP growth is relatively 
stable. Consider that the evolution of sovereign debt-
to-GDP ratios is determined by two types of shocks, 
that is "spending shocks" emanating from structural 
primary balance and interest payment developments and 
"growth shocks" that affect the denominator of the above-
mentioned ratios. While GDP-linked bonds are not helpful 
in avoiding undesirable debt-to-GDP developments as a 
result of the first type of shocks, they can provide a form 
of “recession insurance” to avoid that the second types of 
shocks leads to unsustainable debt-to-GDP ratios (Brooke 
et al., 2013) [12].
Sharp declines in nominal GDP growth occur both in 
advanced and emerging economies and such shocks occur 
roughly every 12 years, at fiscal costs that are on average 
equivalent to an adverse shock equivalent to 6% of 
GDP (IMF, 2016) [13]. Remarkably, such macroeconomic 
shocks are estimated to be as costly as the materialisation 
of contingent fiscal liability risks stemming from the 
financial sector (roughly 9% compared to a situation 
where GDP growth had continued to grow at its five-year 
average), but they are twice less likely to occur than the 
latter. The costs arising from other potential contingent 
liabilities such as failures of SOEs or natural disasters are 
much lower on average and occur much less frequently, 
by contrast (see Figure 2 in IMF, 2017) [12]. Thus, 
mitigating the effects of macroeconomic shocks should 
be an important element of effective sovereign balance 
sheet risk management. Obviously, one important factor 
that determines the ultimate effect on fiscal positions of 
such GDP declines is the extent to which monetary policy 
offsets such pressures by lowering interest rates and thus 
government borrowing costs as well as disinflationary 
pressures on fiscal positions. In a common currency area, 
monetary policy flexibility is however more limited; thus, 
there would be an additional premium on the availability 
of instruments that mitigate fiscal risks.
3.3 Investor Perspective
From the investors’ perspective, GDP-linked bonds 
can provide portfolio diversification benefits. GDP-
linked bonds provide exposure to a country’s growth 
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performance, which is not available from any other single 
investment instrument. For example, while some exposure 
to corporate earning the latter can be acquired through 
investment in listed corporate equity, such exposure 
is only to a narrow subset of such earnings, namely 
to private corporate profits after tax GDP. Moreover, 
exposure to GDP growth reflects a much broader set of 
developments including in corporate earnings, wages, 
salaries and other labour income. While portfolios of 
assets and derivatives could be constructed to replicate 
exposure to GDP growth, any such approach would lack 
the standardisation and tradability advantages that a single 
benchmark GDP-linked bond might provide.
Investors in conventional bonds require the issuer to 
pay default risk and liquidity risk premium. Compared to 
such bonds, investors in GDP-linked bonds would require 
an additional novelty premium (related to the difficulties 
of pricing a new financial instrument) and an indexation 
premium; the latter to compensate for greater volatility 
of total return on GDP-linked as opposed to conventional 
bonds. While the addition of these two premia would 
tend to make GDP-linked bonds more costly than 
conventional bonds, the introduction of the former lowers 
the risk of default on contractual debt, implying a reduced 
default risk premium not only on GDP-linked bonds (as 
opposed to conventional bonds) but also on the remaining 
conventional bonds. The net effect on the aggregate risk 
premiums is uncertain and depends on the mix of GDP-
linked and conventional bonds, the track record of the 
new instruments and the country characteristics.
How significant might the diversification benefits 
be? For an investor attempting to diversify his portfolio 
by investing in another country either through equities 
or GDP-linked bonds, choosing the latter is always 
preferable to choosing the former when the investor 
considers the aim of reducing the variance of the overall 
portfolio, if one assumes that the initial portfolio consisted 
of US stocks and Treasury bills. This finding reflects 
the combined effect of the lower variance of nominal 
GDP growth compared to stock returns and the lower 
correlation with the initial portfolio return of nominal 
GDP growth as opposed to stock returns. Figure 10 
provides an illustration.
GDP-linked bonds also raise a number of practical 
challenges. One is to deal with revisions in GDP numbers, 
which can be very large, including for long past years. 
Another one is to accommodate methodological changes 
in the measurement of GDP, which can also be far 
reaching. Finally, the complexity of GDP compilation, 
which also involves considerable imputation for many 
unmeasured items, may raise questions of trust, which 
could generate a substantial risk premium for GDP 
bonds. To address these issues, a term sheet has been 
developed that sets out a basic structure for such bonds. 
The term sheet is modelled against the background of 
inflation-linked bonds and addresses some key element 
of a suggested structure. For example, bonds would be 
denominated in domestic currency and have maturities 
between 10 and 20 years and be indexed to nominal GDP. 
The principal would be indexed to cumulative growth in 
nominal GDP since issuance, so that debt moves with the 
level of GDP, hence stabilising the debt-to-GDP ratio. A 
six-month indexation lag to quarterly GDP is suggested, 
which roughly corresponds to the third GDP revision.   
3.4 Quantification of Costs and Benefits
Benford et al. (2016) [6] quantify the costs and benefits 
of issuing GDP-linked bonds, analysing how the debt-
to-GDP ratio for a government would evolve in response 
to a series of shocks assuming that its debt is either all 
in conventional or all in GDP-linked bonds. The shocks 
considered include shocks to GDP, interest rates, the 
primary balance and, where debt is issued in foreign 
currency, the exchange rate. Case studies are undertaken 
for a “representative” advanced and emerging economy 
with a debt-to-GDP ratio of 100% and 65%, respectively. 
The shocks are calibrated to be similar to those that 
the representative advanced and emerging economy 
experienced on average every year over the past decade 
and a half. The results suggest that GDP-linked bonds 
considerably reduce the risk of explosive debt dynamics 
in both advanced and emerging economies. For example, 
an (unfavourable) outcome in the 99% (upper) tail for the 
debt-to-GDP ratio of an advanced economy corresponds 
to a value of 120% in the case of GDP-linked bonds 
compared to 175% in the case of conventional bonds. 
By contrast, in the case of an emerging economy, the 
corresponding reduction gained through the issuance of 
GDP-linked bonds amounts to about 20% (i.e. from below 
80% to below 60%). 
The simulations may either overstate or understate the 
benefits to be gained from issuing GDP-linked bonds for a 
variety of reasons. On the one hand, they are based on the 
assumption that historical correlations remain constant; 
the results regarding the gains to be had from issuing 
GDP-linked bonds would change if these correlations 
evolved, however. For example, the correlation between 
growth and interest rates was negative during the 
observation period 1999 to 2015 for the two representative 
case study countries. If that correlation was positive, 
however, the undesirable effect of slower growth on debt 
sustainability would be partly offset by the effect of lower 
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interest rates on sovereign borrowing costs. Thus, the 
benefits from GDP-linked bonds would be smaller. Also, 
the sovereign might decide to increase its total borrowing 
following the introduction of GDP-linked bonds, in which 
case the benefits also would be smaller. On the other 
hand, the benefits to be gained from issuing GDP-linked 
bonds might also be understated: In the past, at least 
some countries have been able to borrow more cheaply as 
growth declined. Going forward, they may experience the 
constraint of an effective lower bound for interest rates. 
Or, institutional arrangements might constrain the ability 
of central bank to accommodate a deteriorating growth 
outlook.
In any case, a crucial issue that determines the benefits 
of the issuer of GDP-linked bonds is the size of the GDP 
risk premium, which is the premium investors would want 
to be paid over the risk-free rate to accept holding an asset 
that pay out lower returns during low-growth periods. 
Some academic studies have attempted to calculate the 
GDP risk premium and estimates range between 35 and 
150 basis points (Abbas, 2017) [14]. Assuming a GDP 
risk premium of 150 basis points, the advantage of 
issuing GDP-linked bonds as opposed to conventional 
bonds would narrow considerably for both advanced and 
emerging market sovereign debtors (Carnot and Pamies 
Sumner, 2017 ) [15], although it would remain sizeable in 
both cases.
3.5 Selected Observations Based on Experiences 
with Inflation-indexed Bonds
One form of debt instrument with indexed payments that 
has met with some success, in terms of actual proliferation 
of instruments, is an inflation-indexed bond. Such a bond 
offers the investor protection against inflation. Both 
the value of the principal and those of the coupons are 
typically protected against inflation, although protection 
may not be perfect from the perspective of the investor 
given that the price index might not be the most relevant 
for the investor and that indexation occurs with some lag. 
In fact, indexation method and lag as well as choice of 
reference index differ from one country to another. That 
said, the main attraction of an inflation-indexed bond is 
that it provides the investor with a long-term predictable 
stream of "real" returns. It is thus a "natural" investment 
for institutional investors that themselves have fixed 
long-term “real” return promises, such as defined-benefit 
pension funds or some life insurance companies. From 
the point of view of the issuer, borrowing costs can be 
reduced to the extent that investors are willing to pay a 
premium for protection against inflation; this premium 
will be reflected in a lower yield paid by the government 
on debt instruments that provide such protection. Issuance 
of inflation-linked bonds has been shown to have 
effectively generated ex-post savings in the real cost of 
financing for a government.
Issuance of index-linked sovereign debt has been 
robust despite a trend decline in inflation over the last 
decade or so. The outstanding volume of index-linked 
debt increased more than twofold between 2007 and 2015 
and has remained broadly constant thereafter. It exceeds 
USD 3 trillion for the OECD as a whole in 2017 (Figure 8), 
with the overwhelming part of it being accounted 
for by the G7 country sovereigns. Admittedly, fixed-
nominal-rate instruments are the dominant sovereign 
borrowing instrument accounting for 90% of the amount 
of outstanding marketable sovereign debt in the OECD. 
That said, such area-wide figures hide considerable 
variation across countries and index-linked bonds have 
in fact become an important debt instruments in several 
countries. For example, index-linked bonds in the United 
Kingdom, Italy and France account for 27.4%, 13.5% and 
12.4%, respectively, of total domestic outstanding central 
government marketable debt (Figure 9).
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The considerations regarding issuance of such bonds 
differ from country to country, but typically involve 
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strategic costs-risk optimisation, an attempt to maintain a 
specific balance between nominal and index-linked debt 
as well as to diversify the investor base, an expectation 
of strong and sustainable investor demand and efforts to 
limit budget volatility and/or strengthen the credibility of 
anti-inflationary policies. For example, some countries 
that decided to issue inflation-indexed bonds did so during 
periods of high inflation (e.g. Brazil, Israel, and the United 
Kingdom), while other countries with high inflation 
decided not to issue such bonds, and yet other countries 
issued such bonds during periods of low inflation (e.g. 
Canada, Germany, Sweden and the United States). Against 
the background of the observation that inflation-indexed 
bonds are by now “standard”, some observers have 
wondered why GDP-linked bonds should not experience 
similar “success”.
Just like inflation-indexed-linked bonds could be 
understood as a portfolio of a nominal interest rate bond 
and an insurance contract against inflation, GDP-indexed 
sovereign bonds could also be understood as a portfolio of 
two financial contracts, that is a "plain vanilla" sovereign 
nominal-fixed-rate bond and an insurance contract with 
payment specified as a function of actual real GDP 
development in reference to a benchmark performance. 
Then the question is why the former bundle of contracts 
implying risk-sharing between sovereigns and their 
creditors has become “standard”, while no sovereign 
has yet issued a GDP-linked bond with returns that vary 
symmetrically, falling with lower GDP and rising with 
higher GDP?
It is clear that indexation to GDP offers additional 
challenges as compared to inflation. For example, it is 
more difficult to estimate real GDP accurately than it 
is to measure consumer price inflation and GDP data 
revisions are often larger than for the CPI, and go several 
years back. Indexing to inaccurate preliminary GDP 
estimates would be problematic and the question is after 
what round of revisions to define the indexing. The moral 
hazard argument might be particularly relevant, as GDP 
measurement is not straightforward and includes the need 
to make choices at different levels of the data collection 
and aggregation. In any case, creating a liquid market for 
any new financial instrument is challenging.
4.  Chal lenges  of  Issuing  GDP-l inked 
Sovereign Bonds in Practise
The OECD Committee on Financial Markets, in 2017, 
held an initial discussion of the issue of potential issuance 
of GDP-indexed-linked bonds as part of a broader 
discussion of selected sovereign debt developments 
and related challenges. This discussion was motivated 
among other things by an attempt to further explore 
potential synergies between the work of the Committee on 
Financial Markets (CMF) and its Working Party on Debt 
Management (WPDM), respecting each entities’ specific 
characteristics. To summarise the initial discussions, 
the Committee expressed concerns regarding current 
levels of sovereign debt level and considered the idea 
of issuing GDP-linked bonds conceptually attractive. 
That said, the Committee also concluded that there are 
unresolved practical issues. Questions arise in particular 
as regards the investor base for such instruments, the cost-
effectiveness of such issuance and market pricing.
The CMF discussions concluded that follow-up work 
could place a sharp focus on the demand side and in 
particular on the question who might be a natural investor 
for what kind of instruments and how deep such investor 
interest might be. In terms of concrete next steps, several 
delegates recommended to revisit the issue as part of a 
CMF Financial Roundtable, the extra-plenary discussion 
between the CMF and private market participants. 
Pursuant to that suggestion, the OECD financial 
roundtable held in April 2018 included a discussion of 
GDP-linked bonds. Also, as part of the follow-up work, 
a survey was conducted by the Agence France Trésor in 
collaboration with the Secretariat of the OECD Working 
Party on Public Debt Management (WPDM). The results 
are described in Chapter 2 of the OECD Sovereign 
Borrowing Outlook 2018 and were presented by the Chair 
of the WPDM at the CMF Financial Roundtable in April 
2018. The remainder of this chapter reports on the results 
of the various discussions including those held as follow-
up to the initial CMF discussions.
The initial CMF discussions concluded that, while 
the idea has conceptual merits, there are unresolved 
practical issues related to the pricing of such bonds, with 
additional liquidity and GDP-uncertainty premia being 
potentially prohibitively high. The size of the indexation 
premium remains a controversial issue, however. On the 
one hand, the observation that GDP uncertainty can be 
substantial is considered by proponents of GDP-linked 
bonds as the crucial economic motivation for considering 
their issuance. For example, Robert Shiller asks pointedly 
“If we acknowledge that, historically, uncertainty about 
GDP is as important as it has been, then why, globally, is 
there such limited risk-management of that uncertainty?” 
in his introductory chapter of a recent monograph on 
sovereign GDP-linked bonds (Shiller, Ostry and Benford, 
2018) [17]. Moreover, some recent conceptual analysis 
suggests that under fairly plausible assumptions regarding 
GDP dynamics for OECD countries, GDP uncertainty 
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premiums would not be prohibitively high, so that 
investor and issuer interest do meet. On the other hand, 
debt management offices emphasise that the size of the 
additional indexation premium might be prohibitively 
high in practise.
Follow-up work to the initial CMF discussions 
included a survey circulated among members of the 
OECD Working Party on Debt Management (WPDM). As 
background, when considering the potential introduction 
of a new debt instrument, DMOs explain that they take a 
long-term debt issuance perspective and consider various 
parameters including investor demand, additional costs 
due to novelty and liquidity premium, potential impact 
on existing instruments and investor diversification. 
Moreover, DMOs monitor primary and secondary market 
developments closely to assess changing investor needs 
to help devise an appropriate strategy with suitable 
instruments for financing debt redemptions and budget 
deficits. The survey circulated among DMOs asked 
pointedly whether and to what extent debt management 
offices (DMOs) have considered issuing such bonds. 
Remarkably, not a single DMO responded that it had done 
so. This observation was stressed by the presentation of 
the Chair of the WPDM as part of the OECD financial 
roundtable. 
Asked for the motivations for considering or not such 
issuance, DMOs quoted the lack of robust and sustained 
investor demand and difficulties in pricing. The recent 
OECD Sovereign Borrowing Outlook 2018 provides 
more details on the considerations of debt management 
offices. It concludes, among other things, that the latter 
do not consider such issuance feasible as there would 
be a lack of investor demand. While some lessons can 
be learned from other state-contingent bonds such as 
sovereign inflation-index-linked bonds, GDP uncertainty 
(to include data revisions and potential revisions in 
the basic methodology) tends nonetheless to be more 
substantial than inflation uncertainty, and there might 
be no “natural investor base” for GDP-linked sovereign 
bonds. Summarising the various concerns among DMOs 
at the CMF Financial Roundtable, the Chair of the WPDM 
noted that the most common response was the higher cost 
compared to conventional bonds. Uncertainty about GDP 
developments and its measurement was large and makes 
issuance practically not feasible.
A recurrent theme in the discussions of GDP-linked 
bonds by the CMF and in other forae is the distinction 
between potential conceptual benefits and practical 
difficulties. As highlighted by a joint workshop on 
sovereign GDP-linked debt instruments undertaken by 
the OECD and the EC in Brussels in January 2018, the 
accumulated evidence of the potential theoretical benefits 
has further grown. For example, Carnot and Pamies 
Sumner (2017) [15] use stochastic simulation frameworks 
to show the results of thought experiment, which is to 
consider that all sovereign debt in Europe had been issued 
in form of GDP-linked bonds. They demonstrate that a 
substantial reduction in the debt-to-GDP ratio would have 
resulted, reflecting in large part the negative relationship 
between the debt-service of GDP-linked bonds and 
actual GDP growth. Benefits are larger the higher is the 
uncertainty on future interest rates and future growth 
rates. They are especially large when debt levels are 
medium to high, that is when there is limited degree of 
fiscal space and uncertainty on exactly how much fiscal 
space there is. From an investor perspective, exposure in a 
symmetrical way to GDP developments, acquired through 
purchase of such bonds could provide diversification 
benefits that might be higher than those gained through 
stock index investments for any given country, which 
stems from the observation that nominal growth in USD 
is usually less volatile and less correlated with standard 
financial portfolios than are equity returns, thus implying 
better diversification gains from investments in GDP-
linked bonds than in local stock market indices (see also 
Cabrillac et.al., 2017) [18]. 
Practical issues remain, however. To address some 
of them, a model set of terms and conditions for GDP-
linked sovereign bonds (the “term sheet”) has been 
developed by an ad hoc working group consisting of 
investment managers, lawyers and economists, including 
from central banks, together with support from ICMA and 
other trade associations. The “London term sheet” aims 
to standardise the features of these bonds. The intention is 
that with greater standardisation, the market will become 
more liquid and appealing to investors and issuers. The 
aim is to have them governed under either NY or London 
law to reduce the risk of local law negatively impacting 
investors, although that issue is especially relevant for 
emerging market economies.
Another session of the above-mentioned EC/
OECD workshop focused squarely on the practical 
issues including the size of the required risk premium, 
understood to be non-trivial. That session concluded that 
issuance of such bonds by advanced economies sovereigns 
are in principle feasible, although a reasonable but not 
excessive premium would have to be offered. In fact, it 
is recognised that the potential benefits for the issuer of 
sovereign GDP-linked debt could be undercut in case a 
very high risk premium is demanded by investors. For 
example, Carnot and Pamies Sumner (2017) [15] estimate 
that a total premium of 150 basis points would reduce 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.30564/jesr.v2i2.474
36
Journal of Economic Science Research | Volume 02 | Issue 02 | April 2019
Distributed under creative commons license 4.0
the debt-stabilisation benefits brought about by GDP-
linked bonds. In particular, under such circumstances, 
and considering debt-to-GDP outcomes between the 10th 
and 90th percentiles, the debt level would turn out to be 
higher with GDP-linked bonds than with conventional 
nominal bonds (other things equal), given the increased 
cost of borrowing associated with the former as opposed 
to the latter. That said, in the case of more unfavourable 
shocks that go beyond the 90th percentile, debt-to-GDP 
ratios would turn out to be lower with GDP-linked bonds 
than with conventional bonds. Considering that shocks 
are persistent, which tends to further increase the required 
risk premium, Fournier and Lehr (2018) [19] suggest that 
the risk premium that compensates for GDP volatility 
looks nonetheless acceptable. This risk premium tends 
to shift the median debt level slightly upwards, but has 
the advantage that extremely high debt levels become 
less likely. As noted as part of the CMF discussions, 
determining what might be the net effect in terms of the 
various risk premiums remains challenging, not least as 
the effect depends not only on the volume or relative share 
of issuance of GDP-linked bonds, but also on the specific 
characteristics of each country.
As additional background, as compared to conventional 
bonds, two additional factors can affect the risk premium 
that applies to GDP-indexed bonds. In addition to 
a liquidity and credit risk premium, a novelty and 
indexation premium characterise the latter, although the 
novelty premium can be expected to disappear and the 
liquidity premium to be further compressed if this type of 
bond becomes more firmly established as part of the range 
of sovereign debt instruments. The indexation premium 
compensates investors for the greater volatility in total 
return. This premium reflects uncertainty about GDP 
developments and the level of the premium charged to 
compensate for that uncertainty. The OECD Committee 
on Financial Markets agreed that this premium remained 
a key issue, while many but not all delegates expected to 
see the novelty and liquidity premium to decline with time 
and amounts issued. That said, the net effect in terms of 
risk premiums after issuance of GDP-indexed bonds both 
on such bonds and on conventional bonds depend not only 
on issuance volumes but on the specific characteristics of 
each country, as highlighted in the stylised illustration in 
Figure 10, which is adapted from Cabrillac et al. (2017) [18]. 
Unfortunately, to have a noticeable effect in terms of 
reducing debt variance, the share of GDP-linked debt issued 
may need to be quite substantial, so much that such ratios 
would not be reached any time soon (Acalin, 2018) [20].
A market for GDP-linked bonds has the potential to 
emerge if issuer and investor expectations on the path of 
real activity growth and related risks diverge, especially 
if investors are more optimistic than the sovereign. Yet 
another condition is that there exist differences in risk 
tolerance. In particular, if investors are less risk averse 
than fiscal authorities and DMOs, the former would be 
expected to be willing to hold GDP-development-related 
risks at a price that is satisfactory to the latter. In this 
regard, hedge funds and institutional investor with long-
term liabilities, such as pension funds (especially where 
pension liabilities are indexed to real activity growth as is 
the case in Italy and Turkey according to the World Bank 
Pensions Database), were quoted as potential investors 
and one investment fund manager mentioned at the EC/
OECD workshop on GDP-linked bonds that its own 
fund would invest at a low but reasonable premium. 
While DMOs argue that there might not be a “natural 
investor base” for GDP-linked bonds, others note that it 
is important to get the design right and tailor instruments 
to buy-and-hold investors (see also Benford and Eguren-
Martin, 2018) [21].  
   
Figure 10. Possible evolution of risk premiums after 
issuance of GDP-linked bonds
Note: The proportions shown in the chart are chosen arbitrarily for 
illustration purposes, in this case assuming that the overall net effect, at 
the level of the total risk premium, is broadly nil.
Source: Adapted from Cabrillac et al. (2017) [18].
Yet another conclusion of the EC/OECD workshop 
session focusing on practical issues was that one 
obstacle for issuance of GDP-linked bonds might 
relate to the debt management mandates. DMOs aim 
at minimising longer-term sovereign borrowing costs 
at an acceptable level of risk, although the focus of the 
risk mitigation mandates appears to be more on micro 
portfolio optimisation and on budgetary risk than on 
broader fiscal actual and contingent risk smoothing. For 
example, the World Bank/IMF Guidelines for public debt 
management identify that best practises are to “ensure 
that the government’s financing needs and its payment 
obligations are met at the lowest possible cost over the 
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medium to long run, consistent with a prudent degree 
of risk.” The definition in this context of risk refers 
essentially to a “micro portfolio optimisation objective” 
rather than to “macro stabilisation” in the form of 
tax smoothing (Barro, 1995) [1] or budget smoothing 
(Goldfajn, 1998 [22]). 
The main concern for debt management offices is to 
maximise the net present value of the stream of proceeds 
from issuing government debt today and in the future 
for a given risk tolerance. The costs and risks of debt 
issuance and management are the guiding posts for 
the funding strategy of debt management offices. The 
assessment of such costs and risks by debt management 
offices will thus determine the choice of funding 
instruments and whether or not to add new instruments 
to the existing range of instruments. While formal 
mandates can also include references to macroeconomic 
object ives ,  including the need to  ensure  broad 
consistency with macroeconomic policy objectives, such 
mandates typically have a clear microeconomic focus, 
which is to reduce borrowing costs for a given risk 
profile. Funding strategies do not operate in a vacuum 
however and, given that debt management offices have 
a vested interest in the quality and reputation of the 
“products” that they are selling, they take into account 
a broader set of current policy challenges. As a result, 
these broader policy challenges also inform debt 
management decisions.
That said, debt managers might take a more narrow 
interpretation of the potential economic benefits of 
such bonds, placing comparatively less attention to the 
potential fiscal and broader economic benefits from a 
potentially better international sharing of risk related to 
GDP developments than some other commentators or 
actors: In theory, issuing governments receive welcome 
fiscal space through debt relief when growth weakens 
and fiscal revenues decline, while investors gain an 
alternative to being locked into low interest rates through 
exposure to the real economy. According to Shiller, 
Ostry and Benford (2018) [17]; foreword by Haldane and 
Obstfeld), “both sides would stand to benefit if the debt-
stabilising effects of issuance mean default risks become 
more remote.”
At the OECD/CMF financial roundtable, the Chair of 
the WPDM emphasised that not a single of the surveyed 
debt managers had considered the issuance of GDP-
linked debt, but that the feedback regarding proposals to 
issue sovereign green bonds was somewhat less negative. 
France and Poland have issued and Belgium did 
consider such issuance, but an issue remains that funds 
are typically not earmarked and that some extra due 
diligence process would have to be introduced, which 
raises costs. A representative from a credit rating agency 
noted that GDP-linked bonds are currently not rated 
but that they might, depending however on a number of 
issues, many of which are already successfully addressed 
in the London term sheet. The closer the instruments are 
to debt the more easy credit rating agencies would find it 
to rate them (see also S&P Global, 2018) [23]. Equity, by 
contrast, would not be rated. On a different but related 
issue, given the large amounts of conventional debt 
outstanding, the credit rating agency representative did 
not think that there would be a significant effect on the 
credit ratings of the debtors’ conventional debt. One 
private market participant suggested that it is important 
to keep the bigger picture in mind and that, just like for 
any new type of debt instrument, there would obviously 
be implementation challenges, but that this aspect is 
a key feature of financial innovation. Another private 
sector participant drew special attention to the London 
term sheet, which provides a model bond description 
setting out a broad structure that is similar to an 
inflation-indexed bonds, although it also deals with the 
risk of statistical manipulation and uncertainties related 
to GDP developments. Such instruments could be seen 
as a first step in a long-term project that should bring 
about a more resilient financial system. Discussions with 
investors have highlighted that this instrument would 
make it easier to take exposure to GDP developments 
across different countries, easier so than in the case of 
alternative strategies involving several types of currently 
available instruments. Another participant noted that 
GDP-index-linked are more similar to derivatives than 
to standard plain-vanilla conventional bonds with fixed 
coupons. In fact, all GDP-linked bonds issued so far 
are warrants that allow the investor to participate in the 
upside risk, and the securities were issued as part of debt 
restructurings.
In summarising the discussions at the CMF Financial 
Roundtable in April 2018, the Chair suggested that the 
issue remains open. Debt management offices remain 
sceptical, although it is not clear whether they take into 
account the full macroeconomic and financial stability 
risk-return trade-off that a broader perspective would 
take into account. He also suggested that the example 
of green bonds suggests that new types of sovereign 
debt instruments can be issued with success. While the 
Chair of the WPDM noted in this context that there 
were however some issues, the Chair suggested that the 
overall experience seemed to have been positive and that 
minor issues would be expected in a new market. In any 
case, careful instrument design, robust institutions and 
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contracts and an appropriate regulatory framework are 
recognised as important conditions to reap the efficiency 
and stability benefits that GDP-linked bonds promise 
in theory. As emphasised by several private market 
participants at the CMF Financial Roundtable, work on 
addressing the practical issues is ongoing.
5. Concluding Remarks and Selected Policy 
Issues
Sovereign borrowing levels in the OECD area have 
stabilised in recent years, although sovereign debt burdens 
remain high by historical standards. Moreover, redemption 
profiles pose serious challenges, and a large part of 
current historically high debt levels need to be refinanced 
over the next few years. Debt management offices are 
aware of, and many of them respond to, these challenges 
among other things by adapting the composition of public 
debt, in the process lengthening the average duration of 
outstanding instruments.
The CMF has paid special attention to the types of 
sovereign debt instruments issued by public debt managers 
and discussed proposals for sovereign debt managers to 
consider issuing GDP-linked bonds. Such proposals are 
timely as the resilience of global financial markets could 
be strengthened by transferring part of the macroeconomic 
risk of undesirable real activity growth outcomes to 
private investors, while at the same time allowing the 
latter to share in the upside risk. Issuance of significant 
amounts of GDP-index-linked bonds could stabilise 
the debt ratios of issuing countries, and help prevent 
potentially costly debt restructurings. That said, CMF 
discussions concluded that, while the idea has conceptual 
merits, there are unresolved practical issues related to the 
pricing of such bonds, with additional liquidity and GDP-
uncertainty premia being potentially prohibitively high. 
Debt management offices remain particularly sceptical, 
as emphasised by the Chair of the CMF’s WPDM at the 
CMF’s financial roundtable discussion and based on a 
survey conducted among members of the WPDM. That 
said, it is not clear whether they take into account the full 
macroeconomic and financial stability risk-return trade-
off that a broader perspective would take into account. 
Proposals for issuance of GDP-linked bonds among 
advanced economies, which had received increased 
attention after the German G20-presidency included 
the topic in the G20 finance track, may have lost some 
momentum. That said, work on resolving practical 
issues is ongoing and involves several private market 
participants including potential investors.
The Committee concluded that follow-up work in 
the broader topic area could enlarge the perspective of 
the work on sovereign debt by also considering other 
types of bonds, such as in particular ultra-long-term 
bonds and those indexed to other state variables such as 
demographics or longevity indices. The Committee could 
revisit some of its work produced a decade earlier on 
the issue of long-term government bonds as potentially 
desirable investment for financial intermediaries with 
long-term fixed payment promises. Such a focus would 
be particularly useful as one key uncertainty surrounding 
the issuance of GDP-linked and other unconventional 
bonds relates to the potential investor demand for such 
instruments. Financial intermediaries with long-term 
liabilities would appear to be an example of a natural 
investor in at least some type of such instruments, such 
as ultra-long-term bonds and those with longevity-
indexation. 
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